Middle Ground — Studies in Critical Thinking

1. Introduction




^[1]

Compromises have a questionable reputation, both in social and in personal life (Benjamin 1990;
Margalit
2010). But not all di
sagre
e
ments
allow of a substantial resolution, even if
open-minded
partic
i
pants seriously
attempt to
convince one another
.
When the disagre
e
ment concerns action or policy
, it
can be
useful to examine whether a
well-reasoned
compromise
would be
feasible.
With t
he
educational
method Middle Ground
,
participants deliberate in an attempt to
d
e
velop
a
reasonable
compromise that settle
s
a
public
controversy.

The method
adds to the existing range of educational resources for
students (high school and
post-secondary
education). Different from many critical thinking resources (e.g.
,
Fisher 2011), reasoning a
s
sessment and critical dispositions are encouraged within the setting of a structured conversation. Different from debate or discussion-oriented education (e.g.
,
Kuhn 2005;
Hess 2009), Middle Ground targets specifically the cooperative exchange of reasons
aimed at a
reasonable
compromise
. In our view, young people should develop a point of view about the
virtues and vices of
compromise
s,
and
deve
l
op
the skills and attitudes for
construing
, what they conceive of as,
second-best
yet socially optimal
outc
omes
(
Gutmann
and
Thompson 2012)
.

 

2. Scholarly background

Inspired by the deliberative shift in political philosophy (
Elster
1995;
Habermas
1996; Rawls
2005
) various practical procedures for opi
n
ion formation and deliberative
decision making
have been developed,
such as deliberative polls
or
town hall meetings (Fung 2003;
Fishkin
20
09
). Middle Ground also incites deliberation, yet with a twist. It employs deliberative techniques to enable participants to
negotiate
a
compromise agreement
in a situation where
they are unable to reach a
genuine
consensus, and to do so in a
maximally
transparent
and
non-manipulative way. In this way, it builds on a recent trend to study legitimate
policy making in
deliberative negotiation (
see:
Mansbridge
et al
.
2010;
Steiner et al
. 2004;
Weinstock 2013;
Wendt 2016).
Mi
d
dle Ground
is tailor-made for issues that generate widely divergent opinions and feelings: gender quota
s
in business, corrective referenda, head scarves at university, the EU-
Turkey refugee deal
, but also the distribution of tasks in a group assignment, or the apportioning of a budget.
Going through
the procedure provides students with opport
u
nities to discuss the quality of the result, to reflect on the process
, and to draw general lessons about negotiation and compromise
.

 

3. General design of the method

Before the three-step procedure
starts
, the moderator (
e.g.
,
teacher) sketches a (possibly) fictive scenario
regarding a particular public controversy
that pressures the participants to work towards a co
m
promise. For example, they are supposed to be the members of a
committee or
board that must rea
ch
an agreement
on
a solution to
the issue at hand. Ideally, the participants start from their authentic opi
n
ions,
though
sometimes it is
needed or
useful
to
ask
some
participants
to
assume the role of a specific stakeholder
.

The first two parts of the procedure aim at encouraging diversity, whereas the third aims at a
n
agreement
(see
Sunstein
and
Hast
i
e 2015)
. P
art
1
revolves around
the expression of the
participants’
first
policy preferences (i.e.
,
those preferences not influenced by the need to accommodate dissenting others),
and
of
the
values
,
interests and perspectives
that
motivate
them to
have
t
h
e
se preferences
.
In
P
art
2
the participants are
pressed
to
temporarily
deal with their differences of opinion as a
practical
problem of distributing or trading items
or commitments to act
—
thereby “
commodifying
” as it were their opi
n
ions.
P
art
3
deals with the
step-wise
development of a compromise
agreement, based on mutual concessions, and
accommodat
ing
the
variety
of
preferences
and motives
.

Participants reason
and argue
,
yet
not to
convince
other
s
of the co
r
rectness of
their
firstly
preferred
solution
, but
(in P
art 1:)
to explain what
motivates
them and
(in P
art 3:)
to find out what middle ground solution
, if any,
would
be
mutually advantageous (van
Laar
and
Krabbe
201
8a
, 2018
b
, 2018
c
. See:
Holzinger
2004;
Amgoud
and
Prade
2006;
Fisher,
Ury
, and Patton 2011)
.
In this way, they try
to arrive at an outcome that each participant prefers to
the status quo
(i.e.
,
the scenario where no compromise is accepted)
and
that
does not allow of an improvement
that
a sufficient number of
others would be willing to
endorse (
Raiffa
, Richardson and Metcalfe 2002).
By means of a simple
book-keeping
device, participants keep track of their
co
l
lective reasoning
.

 

4. Learning objectives and applications

Middle Ground
can be used for
several
learning objectives
that are central in civic education and critical thinking
:
(
a) gaining insight into (historical or topical) public controversies and political processes;
(
b) developing a point of view about the virtues and vices of compromi
s
es;
(
c) obtaining knowledge about the conditions for fruitful negoti
a
tion;
(
d) developing skills for cooperative argumentation, convers
a
tion, listening, and
collective
problem solving;
(
e)
increasing
moral and ideological sensitivity, empathy, spirit of compromise, integrity;
(
f) reducing polarization as well as group thinking.

The
Middle Ground
method
has been
applied at
five faculties of
the University of Groningen
,
The Netherlands
(
in
courses on:
academic skills, business ethics,
philosophy of argument,
leadership skills, and
i
ndustrial
e
ngineering
), and
has been tested in
social science courses at
Dutch
high schools.
Also
, a digital version
has
be
en
developed
, and access can be requested from the author
.

 

5
. The
design of the
method in detail

The details of the Middle Ground procedure will be
introduced
by
means of
an example, namely the controversy about
what form
of direct democracy to adopt on the national level
in the Netherlands
.
I
t is assumed that about 20 students
participate
.

Prior to the Middle Ground procedure
, the
moderator provides the participants with (what is plausibly)
a fictive scenario that
puts some pressure on
the participants to
settle
for
a compromise
. For example, the participants
are
asked to imagine that they
are
commissioned to provide the
Dutch
government
with
adv
ic
e
about
the
form
of direct democracy
to implement, and if
they fail to provide
detailed advice
that receives the
support
of
at least
all
committee members
minus one,
the country fac
es
uproar and
individual
careers
will
get
damaged.

At this preliminary stage, the moderatoralso helps the participants to form (three to five)partiesoflike-minded individuals. In order to arrive at parties of sufficient size the moderator can request someindividuals to assume the role of a specific stakeholder with a specific opinion.In the example, Party Red is a strong supporter of parliamentary, representative democracy, and opposes referenda and all other forms of direct democracy. Party Green is a strong supporter of unfiltered, direct forms of democracy, and it opts for a constitutional change such that major policy decisions are required to get support from a referendum. Party Blue is sympathetic to introducing some forms of democratic innovation so as to give voice to the concerns of citizens, and it is especially attracted to the idea of connecting major policy decisions to a deliberating body of citizens who are selected by lot. Party Purple would be willing to allow for a restricted role for referenda, though it is hesitant when it comes to changing the existing rules of democracy.

In order to prompt thinking about their first preferences (in Step 1) as well as about the ways to commodify their differences of opinion (in Step 2), the moderator may provide the participants with some options: Who initiatesa referendum? For what types of issue?Who is allowed to participate? What kind of turn-outthresholdshould there be, if any? For what kind of policy decisions?Advisory or binding?What role for public debate? What kind of majorityis required?

Finally
, t
he moderator
explains that his/her role
remains
limited to explaining the purpose of each of the steps, and to keeping track of the time.
What follows is a statement of the procedure that can be distributed to the participants.

Part 1: Policy Positions (30 minutes)

(a)
Within your party
, d
ecide who—in Part 3—
will act as the group’s principal negotiator. (1 minute)

(b)
Within your party, e
laborate on your group’s
policy position
(14 minutes)

1. Discuss
   your first policy preference.
2. Discuss your motivation: What are the values, feelings, interestsand principles that lead you to prefer this policy?
3. Express your first policy preference and motivationby means of keywords, and record them on a position poster withthe following format.

(c
)
Each
party attaches its poster on a
wall, and in a plenary session
the groups inform one another about their positions, in 60 s
e
conds, and answer questions. Only questions for clarification (such as “what do you mean
by
this phrase?” or “Why
do you think
this
is
valuable?”) are allowed at this stage, and no crit
i
cism. (15 minutes
)

Part 2: First Compromise Proposals (25 minutes)

(a)
Discuss within your party how you might revise your
firstly
pr
e
ferred policy by making some
concessions that
accommodate cherished values
,
feelings,
interests
or principles
of
other groups
.
Also discuss what concessions you would like other groups
to make
.
(5 minutes)

(b)
Within your party,
express
your first compromise proposal a
s well as
the
reasons why other
groups
might
find
this proposal
(som
e
what)
attractive
, and record them
by means of keywords
on a compromise poster with the following format. (5 minutes)

(c)
Each group attaches its compromise poster below its earlier pos
i
tion p
oster, and in a plenary session
the groups inform one anot
h
er
about their compromise proposals
,
each time
in 60 seconds, and answer questions. No restrictions apply as to the kinds of question. (15 minutes)

Part 3: Seeking Compromise (40 minutes)

(a)
Within
the separate parties
: Each party discusses what compr
o
mise proposal
s
to table, and how to respond to
expected
proposals from others
, after having studied the rules of the plenary negoti
a
tion game (below)
. (
10
minutes)

(
b)
Plenary
negotiation game
: In an inner circle, the principal negoti
a
tors try to arrive at an agreement, now and then consulting the other participants, located at an outer circle
,
in
accord
ance with
the following rules
. (3
0
minutes)

Rule 1.
By lot is it determined which
principal negotiator starts, after which they take turns
clockwise
.

Rule 2.
(a)
At
his/her
turn, a principal negotiator tables, in 60 s
e
conds, a compromise proposal, after which
(b)
there
is limited time
available for questions
for clarification and critical que
s
tions
.
(c)
On the whiteboard, the moderator numbers each such compromise proposal and characterizes it by means of keywords.
Finally
,
(d)
the moderator asks the other
principal
negotiators
whether they
are willing to endorse this proposal.
If
complete unanimity
is not
achieved
, the next principal negotiator takes his/her turn;
If
complete unanimity
is realized
,
Rule 4 applies.

Rule 3.
Each principal negotiator can request once for a
two
-minute time-out when
every negotiator can consult
his/her party
or align bilaterally with other
parties
.

Rule 4.
As soon as the
principal
negotiators strike
an
agreement
with complete unanimity
, the moderator stops the negotiation and i
n
vites all
other
participants to cast their individual vote
s
(“Yes, I am willing to endorse this compromise” or “No, I am not willing to endorse this compromise”)
, if needed preceded by round of questions for clarification
. If the required supermajority
ha
s
been achieved
in the group at large
(unanimity minus one)
the
partic
i
pants succeeded in agreeing on a compromise;
If not the proc
e
dure ends without
an agreed upon compromise
.

Rule 5.
If there is still no
unanimity
among the principal negotiators when
each
of them
has tabled two
compromise
proposals, the moderator invites all participants to cast their individual vote
s
on each of the compromise proposals
listed
on the whiteboard, star
t
ing with compromise proposal #1, followed by #2, and so forth, until a proposal gets the required supermajority
(unanimity minus one)
. There is no limit to the number of “yes” or “no” votes that a participant can submit.
As soon as the required supermajority
ha
s
been achieved
for a proposal
, the procedure ends with an agreed upon
compromise
; If no such supermajor
it
y is
achieved
for any proposal, the procedure ends with
out the participants
agreeing on a compromise
.

 

6. Students evaluation

When the students have finished the middle ground procedure, the
moderator (
teacher
)
and students can evaluate the quality of the pr
o
cess
,
the quality of the outcome
, and draw some general lessons
.

(a)
Process

1. Did we succeed in articulating our motivating considerations ad
   e
   quately? Did we neglect facts,
   values,
   perspectives,
   principles
   ?
2. To what extent did our motivating considerations influence the outcome? Has one group’s position been (dis)favored, and if so, how is that to be explained? To what extent do we think we grasped the essence of the other groups’ positions?
3. To what extent was the outcome enabled by some kind of pressure? Or by some kind of manipulation? To what extent did we succeed in cooperating, when trying to advocate or push our positions?
4. Did we miss an opportunity to arrive at a more optimal solution?
5. To what extent did we feel we had to sacrifice the integrity of our position so as to enable the compromise?
6. What would we like to change in the procedure, or in a future execution of it?

(b) Outcome

1. Are we pleased with the outcome? Is it sufficiently coherent? Is it fair vis-à-vis the diverse perspectives in the group? How would we evaluate this outcome in the real world?
2. Did we change
   our individual
   positions
   as a result of the e
   x
   changes?

 

References

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Benjamin, Martin (1990). Splitting the Difference: Compromise and Integrity in Ethics and Politics. Lawrence KS: University of Kansas.

Elster, Jon (1995). Strategic uses of argument. In: Kenneth J. Arrow, Robert H. Mnookin, Lee Ross, Amos Tversky, and Robert B. Wilson (Eds.). Barriers to Conflict Resolution. (pp. 236-57). New York: Norton.

Fisher, Alec (2011). Critical Thinking: An Introduction. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.

Fisher, Roger, William Ury, and Bruce Patton (2011). Getting to Yes: Negotiating an Agreement without Giving In, 3rd ed. London: Random House.

Fishkin, James S. (2009). When the People Speak: Deliberative Democracy and Public Consultation. New York: Oxford University Press.

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Hess
,
Diana E.
(2009)
Controversy in the Classroom: The Democratic Po
w
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.

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van Laar, Jan Albert, andErik C. W. Krabbe (2018b). The Role of Argument in Negotiation. Argumentation. Online first, doi: 10.1007/s10503-018-9458-x.

van Laar, Jan Albert, andErik C. W. Krabbe (2018c). Criticism and Justification of Negotiated Compromises. In: Steve Oswald, and Didier Maillat (Eds.), Argumentation and Inference: Proceedings of the 2^ndEuropean Conference on Argumentation: Argumentation and Inference, 20-23 June 2017, Fribourg, Switzerland. (pp. 887-908). London: College Publications.

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, Howard, John Richardson, and David Metcalfe (2002).
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, Cass, and Reid Hast
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